Dean Schermerhorn's Blog

Today I finished volume 1 of The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, all 916 pages of it. That is more than 170 pages since my previous post, so I will need to summarize a few high points.
Nazi Germany invaded and conquered Denmark and Norway. Beginning on May 10, 1940, Germany began the invasion and conquest of Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France. Italy followed Germany by invading France. Great Britain then stood alone in Europe in opposition to Hitler. Hull devoted considerable time to fending off the threat of growing German influence in the Western Hemisphere.

The United States had to respond to the Nazi invasion of Denmark because Denmark controlled Iceland and Greenland. Both of those countries were at least partly in the Western Hemisphere and thus fell within the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine. Iceland took action to establish direct diplomatic relations with the United States.

Greenland is definitely in the Western Hemisphere, so Hull believed that the United States should take action to prevent Germany from taking over. He was careful, however, to avoid establishing a U.S. protectorate over Greenland because he did not want to set a precedent that Japan or other nations might use to take over possessions of conquered European nations.

Once France fell and sought an armistice with Germany, Hull was concerned with keeping the French fleet and overseas possessions out of German hands.

With Britain alone facing the Nazi threat, the United States began finding ways to supply Britain with the means to fight on. This included the famous 1940 swap of aging U.S. destroyers for 99-year leases on bases in British Western Hemisphere possessions. Hull recounts this arrangement in some detail.

Hull also tells of the United States’ firm policy toward Vichy France. The U.S. maintained relations with Vichy but objected to its policy of currying favor with Hitler.

In one of the few lengthy discussions of domestic politics, Hull covers his involvement in FDR’s decision to seek a third term as president. Hull notes that he discouraged moves by some who proposed that he succeed FDR in 1940. He also points out that FDR repeatedly assured him that he was Roosevelt’s choice as a successor.

I also noticed that Hull points out that he was not favored by some in the “New Deal group.” At several earlier points, Hull had indicated that he did not share the views of those he considered New Dealers.

With Roosevelt re-elected, U.S. aid to Great Britain increased. Britain, however, was running rapidly out of cash to purchase U.S. armaments and supplies. Thus evolved the concept of Lend-Lease, which the State and Treasury departments developed. FDR explained Lend-Lease using the metaphor of a man lending a neighbor a garden hose when the neighbor’s house is on fire. Roosevelt later gave a Fireside Chat, on December 29, 1940, calling for the United States to become “the great arsenal of democracy.”

Hull then turns to relations with Japan and that nation’s ambition to take advantage of European nations’ conquest by Hitler. Japan appeared eager to move into the Netherlands East Indies (what is now Indonesia) and French Indochina. Hull devoted considerable diplomatic effort to resisting these plans. He credits United States policy toward Japan with giving the U.S. more than a year of peace in the Pacific, time that was used to continue increasing aid to Britain and to prepare the U.S. defenses.

Adding to world tensions and the outbreak of war, Russia has invaded Finland in 1939, as told in The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. I now have read to page 742 in the first of two volumes of these memoirs.

The Soviet Union first applied pressure on the Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and was able to gain influence over those small nations. Finland, however, resisted similar pressure.

President Franklin Roosevelt responded to pleas from Sweden and arranged with Hull to send a telegraph to Moscow, urging the Soviet Union to seek a peaceful resolution with Finland. While Russia sent a polite reply, they did not agree to reduce their pressure on Finland.

U.S.-Soviet relations were complicated by the German capture of an American cargo ship bound for Great Britain. The Germans took the ship City of Flint to the Russian port of Murmansk. The Soviets cooperated with the Germans and kept the American crew out of touch with the U.S. embassy in Moscow. When the Germans finally sailed the ship for Germany, it put in at a Norwegian port, where Norway freed the vessel and crew.

On November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union attacked Finland. In response, United States imposed a moral embargo on Russia, which included restricting shipments of airplane parts and other strategic materials to the U.S.S.R. FDR and Hull did not, however, apply the Neutrality Act to Russia and Finland, wishing to avoid pushing the Soviet Union any closer to Hitler.

Hull later turns to relations with Japan. When the Japanese in essence moved to end British and French influence in China, Hull and the United States stood firm. The U.S. would keep its troops in China, which were meant to protect American citizens and maintain order. The Japanese also installed a puppet government in China in March 1940, which the United States would not recognize.

Hull also deals with the expiration of a 1911 U.S.-Japan treaty of commerce, which was due to expire in early 1940. Hull did not want to negotiate a new treaty while Japan continued its aggression and violation of U.S. rights and interests in China. When the treaty expired, the United States continued its trade relations with Japan as before. The United States did, however, impose a moral embargo on exporting any plans or materials that would help Japan produce aviation fuel.

The memoirs then cover United States’ disagreements with Great Britain over neutral rights on the high seas. The British were examining U.S. mail, diverting American ships to British ports for search and detaining American ships in the Mediterranean. These actions resulted in Hull lodging formal protests with the British and in the arousing of public opinion against Britain. Hull notes, though, that the U.S. was careful not to exacerbate relations with Great Britain. Britain gradually eased up on the actions that had irritated the United States.

The next chapter opens with Hull disagreeing with Roosevelt about sending Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles on a special peace mission to meet with European leaders. While FDR asked Hull for his approval of this mission, and Hull did not object, Hull did state that such a mission might raise unrealistic hopes for peace. Hull saw that the “phony war” in western Europe probably would end soon. FDR approved of the Welles mission anyway.

This event was evidence of FDR’s propensity for sending his own special representatives to meet with foreign leaders, and Hull’s resistance to such efforts to operate outside the normal State Department channels. I will be interested to read about further examples of FDR and Hull clashing over this practice.

I have now read to page 700 in the Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Since my previous post, Germany has invaded Poland and plunged Europe into World War II.

The story continues during 1939, as Hull recounts the United States’ difficult relations with the Soviet Union.

One small detail that I have noticed in Hull’s writing is that he seems never to fail to point out that Franklin Roosevelt loved to travel by sea. It seems as if every other time that he tells of communicating with FDR, the president is aboard a ship.

Part 3 of the memoirs ends with Germany invading Poland. Part 4 concerns 1939-1940 and the United States’ effort to remain neutral. Hull notes his disagreement with FDR over words that the president inserted into a message of September 3, 1939, stating U.S. neutrality. FDR added his statement that he could not expect Americans to remain neutral in thought. “Even a neutral has a right to take account of facts,” Roosevelt said. While Hull emphasized that he favored Britain and France, he thought that FDR’s statement was unnecessary and could arouse criticism that FDR would involve the United States in the war.

Hull then turns to the problems for the United States as a neutral nation, especially with Great Britain. These involve the rights of neutrals to trade and transport cargo by sea during wartime. A naval power, such as Great Britain, seeks to limit those rights, while a neutral nation that relies on maritime trade, such as the United States, seeks to expand them. Hull also tells of protests by Germany over U.S. ships seeking to evade German warships who intended to stop and search them when sailing near France and Britain.

At several points in these memoirs, Hull devotes considerable attention to relations with the Latin American republics and the Good Neighbor policy. He returns to that topic to tell of the American republics’ stance on neutrality and of keeping the war out of the Western Hemisphere.

Hull recounts his struggle with Congress to end the arms embargo contained in the neutrality laws. Nevada Senator Key Pittman chaired the Senate Foreign Relations committee and thus controlled neutrality and trade legislation. The chapter ends by discussing the sale of older U.S. ships to other nations and the beginning of French and British arms purchases in the United States.

Hull’s book presents an interesting picture of the diplomatic challenges that the United States faced even before our entry into World War II.